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Abstract
Do policies that alter the allocation of human capital across individuals aﬀect the
innovation capacity of an economy? To answer this question I extend Romer’s growth
model to allow for individual heterogeneity. I ﬁnd that the value of an invention rises
with equality. If skills and talents are evenly distributed, inventions are more widely
adopted in production and users are willing to bid a higher price. Therefore more
inequality is associated with a larger share of the population employed in the business
of invention. But, somehow surprisingly, the analysis suggests that although an equal
society values inventions more than an unequal one, it may produce fewer of them, or,
equivalently, generates inventions of a lower quality. A calibration of the model suggests
a weak, but positive, relationship between the rate of innovation and inequality.
Finally, in a two-country world, in which ideas, individuals, and capital circulate
without restrictions, I ﬁnd that the unequal economy tends to specialize into the busi-
ness of innovation.
T h em a i ni m p l i c a t i o no ft h ea n a l y s i si st h a ta no b s e r v e dd i ﬀerence in the innovation
rate between two countries with similar levels of education can hardly be attributed to
variations in domestic human capital policies.
Keywords: human capital, inequality, innovation
JEL Classiﬁcation: O15; O31
1 Introduction
Reforms of the education system are often dictated by the desire to foster cognitive abilities
of students or by shifts in the notions of equality of opportunities and of social justice. For
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1instance, some countries choose to track students into diﬀerent school types, hierarchically
structured by performance, as early as the age of ten (this is the case in Austria, Germany,
Hungary, and the Slovak Republic), whereas others keep the entire lower secondary school
system comprehensive or design some blend of the two systems. The choice of the structure
of the education system aﬀects the distribution of human capital. In an international com-
parative study, Hanushek and Wößmann (2006) found that grouping, for instance, increases
the variance of pupils’ attainments. The allocation of government funding among diﬀerent
levels of education is another, perhaps more direct, way in which educational policies aﬀect
the distribution of human capital. Castelló and Doménech (2002) documented an historical
cross-country convergence of this type of inequality.
How do variations in the distribution of human capital aﬀect a country’s ability to inno-
vate?
Policy makers seem to be quite attentive to news reporting increased gap in students
achievement, although it is unlikely that their interest is driven by concern about the long-
run performance of the economy. In 1982, an oﬃcial inquiry by the Cockcroft Committee
in England and Wales found that a seven year diﬀerence existed in pupils’ mathematical
attainments. This conclusion had fundamental consequences for the reorganization of the
British school system. A National Curriculum established at the end of the 1980s set the
target of containing 11-year-old pupils’ attainment in the range of six-year span for 80 percent
of the pupils1. The 2001 No Child Left Behind Act echoes similar concerns.
I will argue that any distributional change in human capital puts into motion forces
aﬀecting unavoidably both the demand and the supply of inventions2. The premise is that
the more educated or talented individuals of a society supply inventions, which are used by
producers to rend the production of a consumption good more eﬃcient. The main insight
of the analysis is that an increase in the dispersion of human capital causes a reduction
i nt h ev a l u eo fi n n o v a t i o n sa n di nt h en u m b e ro fi n v e n t o r s ,b u ta tt h es a m et i m ei ta l s o
enhances inventors’ productivity. In principle the innovation rate — which depends both on
the number and quality of inventors — can be higher or lower in an economy with a more
dispersed distribution, depending on the technical features of the sectors that produce and
use inventions. Some calculations based on aggregate data suggest that institutional reforms
— such as redistribution of resources from one educational level to another, or in the form
of leveling pupils’ achievements within a given level of education — are unlikely to alter
signiﬁcantly the innovation capacity of a closed economy, but do have major consequences
1For a detailed discussion see Prais, 1993
2In the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e rt h et e r m sinvention and innovation will be used interchangeably, for
whenever an idea is generated it always ﬁnds a use, and an improvement in output production is always
based on some invention. The Schumpeterian distinction will become relevant only in sections (8) and (9)
when a country can innovate by using foreign inventions.
2on how much innovation is performed in an open economy.
To gain some intuition on the nature of the results, imagine that an individual, with
human capital h, can produce a ﬂow of output equal to hαkβ,w h e r ek denotes physical
capital, and the parameters α + β<1 (diminishing returns). For a given price of capital,
p, the (inverse) demand function of an individuals with human capital h is p = βhαkβ−1.I n
an economy with N individuals, each of whom is endowed with hi for i =1 ,2..N, the total
(direct) demand for capital will be (p/β)1/(β−1) X
h
α/(1−β)
i .3 In virtue of the diminishing
returns, the total demand for capital is large ri nt h em o r ee q u a le c o n o m y . F o ri n s t a n c e
consider two extreme cases one in which human capital is equally distributed and one in
which it is concentrated in only one individual. In the former case the demand for capital
is equal to (p/β)1/(β−1) N¯ hα/(1−β),w h e r e¯ h is the average amount of human capital, whereas
in the latter case it is (p/β)1/(β−1) (N¯ h)α/(1−β). A sl o n ga st h e r ea r ed i m i n i s h i n gr e t u r n s
this quantity is lower than the one computed for the equal economy. In the economy that I
consider the price of capital is set by a monopolist who purchases a licence from an inventor
granting him the exclusive right to produce machines. Therefore, in a more equal economy
the capital producer expects to face a larger demand and earn bigger proﬁts out of the use
of the license. By the same token an inventor expects to receive more generous bids from
capital producers in an equal economy. The descending curve of the ﬁrst quadrant of Fig.
(1) illustrates an hypothetical relationship between inequality and the market value of an
invention. The fourth quadrant suggests that the higher the invention’s value, the greater the
number of people who want to be inventors (horizontal axis), for their rewards rise with it.
But human capital inequality aﬀects also inventors’ productivity. The average human capital
endowment of the top percentiles of the distribution is bigger in a society where human
c a p i t a li ss p r e a do u ta r o u n dt h em e a nt h a no n ei nw h i c hi ti sc o n c e n t r a t e da r o u n d( t h e
same) mean. If inventors belong to the group of the more educated or talented individuals,
their average productivity is then higher in a society where human capital is dispersed.
The second quadrant of the ﬁgure illustrates such a relationship. In quadrant (III) two
hypothetical ’innovation-isoquants’ are plotted, A and B. Along an innovation-isoquant the
rate of innovation is constant, whereas moving from one to another one below it (not shown)
in the south-west area, would be equivalent to moving towards higher innovation rates — that
is the rate of innovation increases both in the number of inventors and their quality. In the
third quadrant the two dots x and y represent the combination of number of inventors and
average quality of inventors associated with a high and low level of inequality, respectively.
What is the shape of the isoquant? How can the two dots x and y be determined? The
answer to these questions is one of the main concerns of the paper. If the correct isoquant
























is A, then the point x lies on a lower (more towards south-west) isoquant, and therefore
the unequal economy innovates at a faster pace. Conversely, if the correct isoquant is B the
more equal economy is a better environment for spurring innovation. In sum, the more equal
economy tends to have a higher invention’s price and more inventors than the unequal one,
but unfortunately the more pressing question — which one of the two economies innovates
more — can be answered only after a more careful analysis of the forces behind the demand
and supply of ideas.
Such analysis is the contribution of this paper. After proving the existence of a balanced
growth path (BGP), I employ the calibration technique to study the long run performance of
economy. One problem with calibrating the model is the absence of a consensus on what the
distribution of human capital looks like. I circumvent the issue by comparing the simulated
patterns of distributional changes in income, caused by shocks in the dispersion of human
capital, with the actual US income distribution at diﬀerent times.
The calibrated model suggests a modest but positive relationship between inequality and
the innovation rate, in the order of 0.15% faster innovation as a response to a 0.1 increase in
4t h ei n c o m eG i n ic o e ﬃcient (this ranges in the unit interval).4 I then reconsider the eﬀect of
inequality on the innovation rate when ideas can freely move across countries, and these are
identical but for the dispersion of human capital. The mechanisms described for the closed
economy still hold, but give rise to a stronger positive relationship between inequality and
innovation. More importantly, I ﬁnd that the unequal economy tends to specialize in the
innovation business, in the sense that the relative share of inventors and the relative supply
of inventions are signiﬁcantly larger than the ratio of the respective Gini coeﬃcients.
The analysis is developed within the tradition of ideas-based models, as exempliﬁed
in Romer (1990), which I extend here to allow for individual heterogeneity. The growth
literature has studied extensively the dynamic consequences of human capital. Lucas (1988)
and Uzawa (1965) have hypothesized that the growth rate of the economy is driven by the
accumulation of human capital, whereas Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Romer link such a
rate to the stock of human capital, rather than its variation. However, this early literature
has not addressed the question of how the distribution of human resources across diﬀerent
economic activities aﬀects subsequent growth. Baumol (1990) marshalled a great variety of
historical evidence showing that a society that allocates its best entrepreneurial talents into
unproductive (and yet innovative) activities is likely to decline in the long run. His analysis
suggests that linking the long run growth of the economy only to the overall supply of human
capital, as it is done in the endogenous growth models, is unlikely to account for diﬀerent
historical experiences of countries that on average look similar.
A more detailed account of how this paper is linked to the literature is given in Section
(2). Section (3) describes the extension of Romer’s model, and proves the existence of an
equilibrium for a generic human capital distribution. A ﬁrst discussion of the links between
human capital dispersion and innovation is provided in section (4) through three examples;
in one Romer’s key equilibrium condition is obtained as a special case; in the other two, such
links are illustrated under alternative human capital distributions. Section (5) carries out
the aggregation and characterizes the economy’s balanced growth path. The calibration of
the model is illustrated in section (7). The analysis is then extended in sections (8) and (9)
to illustrate how the closed-economy results are modiﬁed in a world with free circulation of
ideas. Some considerations on issues that remain open for further research are collected in
section (10).
2 Review of the Literature
I draw from two diﬀerent strands of literature. The motivation is built from studies that
look at the trade-oﬀ between equality of opportunities and eﬃciency in promoting learning.
4As it will be clariﬁed in Section (2), this relationship is weaker than that found by Barro (2000).
5But the paper’s contribution is mostly to that long stream of studies that has explored the
links between inequality, human capital, and economic growth.
There have been a variety of deﬁnitions of equality of opportunities. Atkinson (1980)
concluded that there is a core agreement between philosophers and social scientists on its
meaning: people’s earnings should be strictly related to inborn abilities. His interpretation
of this notion was not, however, that two individuals with the same innate abilities should
earn the same, but rather that the ’ex-ante distribution of earnings is the same for all people
with identical innate abilities’ (p. 78), implying that the task of identifying discrimination, a
situation in which earnings are systematically higher for people of one sex, race, or religious
group, is quite daunting. I remain agnostic with respect to the issue of discrimination, for
I am not concerned with the social circumstances that lead to variations in the distribution
of human capital. It has been said that income segregation has been on the rise, and
that this has led to a wider diﬀerences across schools’ ﬁnancial resources in places where
education is locally ﬁnanced. 5 Some argued that schools admission policies aﬀect human
capital distribution, as they have become better in tracking students by ability.6 More
recently the press has documented that an increasing fraction of both federal and state
US ﬁnancial aids to students is merit-based7. Clearly the school system can be a powerful
instrument aﬀecting equality of opportunities, for instance by providing better education to a
selected group of students. As mentioned in the introduction some countries choose to track
students according to performance, while others group them simply according to age. From a
theoretical perspective it is not clear whether the peer eﬀect that allow low ability students
to learn from high ability students is strong enough to oﬀset the potential loss of having
homogenous classrooms, in which, arguably, a more focused curriculum and appropriately
paced instruction are provided (Argys, Rees, and Brewer (1996); Dobbelsteen, Levin and
Oosterbeek (2002)). But a large part of the empirical literature suggests that grouping
increases the variance of pupils’ attainments, although there is quite a lot of disagreement
on whether it also enhances the average students’ achievements. Recently Hanushek and
5See Fernandez (2001) for a review of some of the most important contributions that study the links
between sorting, education, and inequality.
For an explanation of why a decline in group inequality has not led to an equivalent reduction in the levels
of segregation in cities with large minority population, see Sethi and Somanathan (2004)
6Herrnstein and Murray (1996, ch. 4) argue that sorting at the highest level of education became a
widespread phenomenon sometimes in the late 1950s, when the ﬁnest college and university from being
school for the local socioeconomic elite, became populated with some of the brightest minds attracted from
all over the country.
7See June Kronholz. Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition). New York, N.Y.: Sep 23, 2002. p. B.1). The
beginning of this new trend is usually associated with the legislation passed by the state of Georgia in 1993
when it launched the ﬁrst state merit program, known as the HOPE scholarship, an attempt to reduce the
ﬂow of bright students to out-of-state colleges, and increase college attendance.
6Wößmann (2006) found these results in an international comparison8.
This paper is also related to the theoretical and empirical literature that has explored
the links between inequality and growth. Three excellent papers surveying these links are
Benabou (1996b), Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Peñalosa (1999), and Benabou (2004). The
surprising evidence found by Perotti (1996), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Persson and
Tabellini (1994), that equality and growth may go hand in hand spurred numerous works
searching for explanations. Benabou (1996a), Durlauf (1996), Aghion and Bolton (1997),
Piketty (1997), Benabou (2002), Galor and Moav (2004), building or extending previous
works by Loury (1981), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Banerjee and Newman (1993), and
Galor and Zeira (1993), entertain the hypothesis that credit constraints limit the ability to
invest in physical or human capital for people with little or no endowments. In presence of
diminishing returns, redistribution (from rich to poor) causes an increase in the productivity
of aggregate capital, and, as a result, the economy expands at a faster pace.9 Similarly, I ﬁnd
that the value of an idea, which can be thought as the result of human capital investment,
declines with inequality, and such decline is driven by the assumption of diminishing re-
turns on capital (on a broad sense, physical and human capital). However, my conclusion is
diﬀerent from that of the credit-market imperfection literature, and it rather agrees with pa-
pers that predict a positive relationship between inequality and growth. Galor and Tsiddon
(1997b) analyze speciﬁcally the link between human capital distribution and growth using
aq u i t ed i ﬀerent argument than the one illustrated in this paper. Their main point is that
at an early stage of development some level of educational inequality is not only beneﬁcial
but necessary for the economy to take-oﬀ. The knowledge acquired by a selected group of
people generates a global externality, as it favors human capital accumulation in the rest of
the population. In a related paper Galor and Tsiddon (1997a) conjectures that in a period
of rapid technological changes, the human capital of parents becomes less important, social
mobility increases and a there is more concentration of high-ability workers in technologically
advanced sectors. This leads to a temporary increase in inequality during the dissemination
phase of the major technological innovation, although, once the knowledge of the new tech-
nologies is spread, the initial conditions become important again, and inequality decreases,
although it becomes more persistent. Their analysis focuses on the role of intergenerational
8Other studies have followed diﬀerent approaches. A selection of empirical papers focused on the UK
school system can be found in Heath (1984). For the US see Slavin (1990). Meghir and Palme (2005) discuss
reforms in Sweden and other European countries. It should be noticed that Figlio and Page (2002) are in
disagreement with most of the literature that grouping raises the variance of pupils’ achievements.
9This reasoning turns on its head Keynes’s investment indivisibilities argument contained in the Economic
Consequences of the Peace (1920). He held that the immense accumulation of capital at the turn of the
century could have not be made with an equal distribution of wealth, for large investment projects could be
carried out only because vast amount of resources were controlled by a small group of people.
7mobility as the main driving force of inequality and growth acceleration, while my model
emphasizes the allocation of human resources between production and invention activities.
Also Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) reach a similar conclusion but using a diﬀerent type of
argument. He hypothesizes that in unequal societies, the median voter, whose income is
below the average, tends to elect representatives that favor high rates of taxation to ﬁnance
spending in public education. This will raise human capital and hence growth. More re-
cently, Aghion, Meghir, and Vandenbussche (2005) addressed the question of how the human
capital distribution inﬂuences economic growth. They argue that the eﬀect of education on
growth is best understood by considering at the same time the features of the educational
system — the relative weights of various levels of education — and the distance of the country
from the technological frontier. They suggest that in countries close to the frontier, growth
is mostly driven by tertiary education, whereas in countries far away from the frontier, pri-
mary and secondary education should play a central role in the expansion of the economy,
as this is what is needed to adopt foreign technologies. Although they do not discuss the
matter of income inequality, it is likely that such an extension would predict an increase in
inequality as the country moves closer and closer to the technological frontier, because this
movement is associated with a rising fraction of people gaining better education, and hence
higher wages.
The panel data estimations performed by Kristin Forbes (2000) and by Robert Barro
(2000) bring support to the theoretical results of a positive association between inequality
and growth. Forbes, who extended Perotti (1996) estimation by including regional and time
ﬁxed-eﬀects, estimates a surprisingly high value of 1.3 for the coeﬃcient associated with the
Gini value — that is, she predicts that an increase of the Gini coeﬃcient of 0.1 raises the
average annual growth rate in the subsequent 5-year period of 1.3 percent. Barro included in
the panel regressions variables omitted in Perotti’s and Forbes’s regressions, such as terms
of trade, the investment ratio, as well as rule-of-law and democracy indexes. He found a
more modest positive correlation of 0.5 between growth and inequality (still measured by
the Gini coeﬃcient) for countries with a per capita GDP above $2070 (in 1985 US dollars)
and a negative one of about the same magnitude for the remaining countries. Banerjee and
Duﬂo (2003) attribute the conﬂicting conclusions reached by the empirical literature on the
sign of the relationship between inequality and growth to the fact that this literature has
imposed a linear structure. If the actual relationship is not linear — and they found that it
is not — diﬀerent variants of a linear speciﬁcation, they argue, are likely to deliver a diﬀerent
sign for the estimated coeﬃcient. Motivated by this evidence Bandyopadhyay and Basu
(2005) provide a model and calibrate it using cross-country inequality data that reproduces
the non-linear relationship between growth and inequality.
83T h e B a s i c M o d e l
The model that I propose is an extension of the well known Romer’s R&D growth model, in
which innovation activities are carried out by proﬁt maximizing individuals and come in the
form of an expansion in the variety of capital goods employed for the production of a ﬁnal
output. First I brieﬂy summarize the main features of the theoretical framework and then
illustrate the departures from it.
The economy consists of three sectors. One produces a good that can be either consumed
or used in the manufacture of durable goods. Such a good is produced with the help of labor,
human capital, and a number of durable goods that expands over time as more designs are
created. Only labor and human capital are used in the creative process. In addition it is
assumed that the creative process is facilitated by the positive spillovers of accumulated
knowledge, and this is measured by the number of existing designs. Users bid up the renting
or purchasing price of the design up to the point in which it is equal to the overall monopoly
rent that the use of the design in production is expected to generate in the future. Spillovers
are allowed in the phase in which blueprints are generated, but not when they are used in
production.
In Romer (1990) individuals are endowed with the same amount of human capital. The
objective of this section is to study the consequences of relaxing this assumption.
The economy is populated by inﬁnitely-lived individuals of measure 1. Each individual is
endowed with one unit of time, used either to produce a ﬁnal good or to generate inventions.
An individual employed in the ﬁnal good sector operates a ﬁrm that produces a ﬂow of







where q(i) denotes the quantity of a durable good i ∈ [0,N],hindicates the level of human
capital of the individual who runs the ﬁrm, and α, β,a n dz are positive parameters.
The chief advantage of specifying the output function as in Eq. (1) is that the marginal
productivity of durable good i does not depend on that of durable good j (for i 6= j), a
feature that greatly simpliﬁes the derivation of the demand function for durable goods. This
production function is similar to the one proposed by Ethier (1982), Spence (1976), Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), and Romer (1990), except that here each individual employed in production
runs his own ﬁrm, a departure dictated by the desire of relating the analytical results of this
paper to the literature that studies the links between income growth and inequality under
the assumption that agents have a limited access to the credit market.
Proﬁt maximization leads to the optimal condition
z(h)
αβq(i)
β−1 = p(i), (2)
9where p(i) is the price of one unit of intermediate input i.The previous expression can also







3.1 The monopoly price
T h em a r k e td e m a n df u n c t i o nf o rd u r a b l eg o o di is derived by summing up all individual
demand curves, which yields the revenue of the intermediate good producer i.I n t e g r a t i n g









α/(1−β)d ˜ F(h), (4)
where ˜ F(h), yet to be determined, denotes the number of ﬁnal good producers with a level
of human capital equal or less than h. One unit of durable good i is obtained from η units
of forgone consumption that can be rented at rate r. Then the ﬂow of marginal cost of
producing one unit of durable good i is the interest payments rη. I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a t
the non-discriminatory monopoly rental price is the same for all durable goods, that is
p(i)=¯ p = rη/β.A design can extract in every period the following rent:











α/(1−β)d ˜ F(h). (5)
Therefore the value of a new design created at time t is the discounted stream of proﬁts
that the intermediate good producer can expect to gain from renting the durable good to a






where πs is deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) ,T i st h el e n g t ho ft i m ed u r i n gw h i c ht h ei n v e n t o re x t r a c t s
a rent from the blueprint, R(t,s)=
R s
t rvdv,a n dr(v) is the instantaneous discount rate at
time v.
If the interest rate is constant (a circumstance that will be veriﬁed in the equilibrium
















α/(1−β)d ˜ F(h). (6)
In order to determine the allocation of individuals between output production and the the
innovation sector, a reward function for the inventors must be speciﬁed.
Someone with human capital h can produce a ﬂow of ideas equal to δ(h)φN,w h e r eδ is a
productivity parameter and N is the number of existing designs. The underlying assumption
10is that existing designs provide useful knowledge in elaborating a new design, and that such
knowledge is accessible at not cost. The parameter φ>0 is the elasticity of the ﬂow of ideas




3.2 Labor market equilibrium
A ﬁnal good producer will choose an amount of durable goods according to equation (3)
with p(i) replaced by rη/β, if the design still commands a monopoly rent, and by the
marginal cost rη otherwise. Let ¯ qm(h) and ¯ qc(h) be the resulting demand function under
the two circumstances, respectively. Let M measure the number of old vintages rented at
competitive price. The ﬂow of output produced by an individual with skills h employed in




β +( N − M)(¯ q
m(h))
β],









β/(1−β)N[m +( 1− m)(β)
β/(1−β)], (8)
where m = M/N. One can show that the income of an individual h employed in the ﬁnal





where χ =( 1 − β)[m +( β)β/(1−β)(1 − m)]z1/(1−β)(
β
rη)β/(1−β) —w i t hm av a r i a b l et ob e
determined.
At this point the all the elements needed to state a condition that indicates how people
sort themselves between the occupation of inventors and ﬁnal-good producers have been
discussed. But the condition will crucially depend on the relationship between φ and α
1−β.
Hence, the following assumption is made.
(A1) The elasticity of ideas production with respect to human capital, φ, is larger than
the ratio α
1−β.
Lemma 1 Under assumption (A1), only people with the highest level of human capital are
engaged in invention activities.
11Proof. Let an individual with human capital ¯ h be indiﬀerent between being employed as
an inventor or as a ﬁnal good producer. Then ¯ h must be that value so that wI(¯ h)=wy(¯ h),
or equivalently
δ¯ h
φ ¯ P =¯ χ¯ h
α
1−β, (10)
where a bar on P and χ indicates the value of these variables when the indiﬀerent individual
is h = ¯ h. The above equality implies that ¯ P = 1
δ¯ χ¯ h
α
1−β−φ.Let individual L be endowed with




1−β−φ as an inventor, whereas, according to Eq. (9) L would earn wy (hL)=
¯ χN(hL)
α










. Likewise, it can be proved that wI (hH) >
wy (hH),w h e r ehH > ¯ h. Hence the claim of the lemma.
Next I show how to obtain ¯ h, for a given interest rate and under the condition (A1)10.





























¯ χ =[ e x p ( −¯ gT)+( β)






Proposition 1 Under the assumption (A1) there exists an ¯ h which solves the system (S1).
Proof. Let the functions Π(ˆ h),P(ˆ h),g (ˆ h) be deﬁned by the right-hand side of equa-
tions (11), (12) and (13), respectively, with the variable ¯ h being replaced by ˆ h,a n dl e t
the function χ(g(ˆ h)), be deﬁned by the right side of equation (14), with ¯ g being replaced
by g(ˆ h). In order to ﬁnd an equilibrium I study, in order, the behavior of P(ˆ h) and that
of the product of ˆ h
α
1−β−φ with 1
δχ(g(ˆ h)). By inspecting the right side of equation (12)
one realizes that: i)P0(ˆ h) > 0, ii) limˆ h→0 P(ˆ h)=0 , and the limˆ h→+∞ P(ˆ h)=C, where
C = 1







0 hα/(1−β)dF(h).I tr e m a i n st ob ev e r i ﬁed that
the function Π(ˆ h)=1
δχ(g(ˆ h))ˆ h
α
1−β−φ crosses P(ˆ h) for some ˆ h. The value of the expres-
sion Π(ˆ h) a tt h ee x t r e m e so ft h es u p p o r to ft h ec d fF(h) is best understood by verifying
that of χ(g(ˆ h)) and ˆ h
α
1−β−φ, since it is the product of these two expressions divided by δ.
10In principle one can determine ¯ h under the more general condition that α
1−β 6= φ. however I focus the
attention on the case in which (A1) applies, as such a restriction will be imposed on the equilibria to be
discussed in the coming sections.
12Notice that: i) limˆ h→0 ˆ h
α
1−β−φ =+ ∞;i i )t h elimˆ h→∞ ˆ h
α
1−β−φ =0 ;iii) limˆ h→0 χ(g(ˆ h)) =
(β)β/(1−β)(1 − β)z1/(1−β)(
β
rη)β/(1−β); iv) limˆ h→∞ χ(g(ˆ h)) = (1 − β)z1/(1−β)(
β
rη)β/(1−β).T h e r e -
fore, limˆ h→+∞Π(ˆ h)=0and limˆ h→0 Π(ˆ h)=+ ∞. Because both P(ˆ h) and Π(ˆ h) are continuous
there must be a value ˆ h = ¯ h where P(¯ h) and Π(¯ h). Hence the claim.














≈P(¯ h) [i.e. the value of a design]
=[ e x p ( −¯ gT)+( β)




where the left-hand side is wI(¯ h)/N and the right-hand side wy(¯ h)/N. T h i si sak e y
equation of the model. Notice that it does not depend on the parameters η or on z,( f o rt h e
same general equilibrium considerations that in Romer’s model the corresponding equilibrium
equation is not aﬀected by the technological parameters —see Romer (1990), S93).
4 Discussion: Human Capital Inequality and the Rate
of Innovation
The link between inequality and innovation will be illustrated by starting from the extreme
case in which all individuals are identical, as in Romer (1990). Then the scenario is slightly
modiﬁed to allow for only two types of people, one of whom has a higher level of human
capital than the other. In a third scenario the distribution is uniform in given interval.
Interestingly, most of the insights emerge already when moving from homogenous individuals
to two-types of individuals. Before proceeding I must note that although in all the three
scenarios the interest rate is exogenously given11, none of the qualitative results that will
emerge are aﬀected by this assumption.
4.0.1 Example 1: Romer as a special case
Consider a degenerate frequency distribution f(h) with a mass of probability one at h = H,















11The determination of the interest rate requires the deﬁnition and characterization of a balance growth
path, which will be done in section (5).






which is the same as the key equation in Romer (1990) — that is equation (11’) at pag. S92—
provided that φ =1 .
4.0.2 Example 2: Two Types of Individuals of Equal Size
The economy is populated by two types of individuals. Let H1 and H2 denote the per-capital
human capital of individual of type-1 and type-2, where H1 = H(1−ε), H2 = H(1+ε).and
 >0.The population is equally split between the two types of individuals. From Lemma
1 we know that the most skilled individuals are inventors. Let l2 be the fraction of type-2
































otherwise. Since the number of inventors is likely to be less than half of the population I




















where γ = 1+ 
1− , is a measure of human capital inequality. This equation suggests that higher
inequality produces two opposite eﬀects on the share of individuals engaged in innovative
activity. On the one side type-2 individuals are more skilled and therefore ﬁnd it more
attractive to be inventors — ﬁrst term inside the square brackets. On the other side higher
inequality reduces the demand for intermediate products, and consequently both the value of
an innovation and the inventor’s reward decline. In Fig. (2.A), where 1
2l2 is plotted against  ,
the former eﬀect dominates the latter one for small departures from an equal situation (small
 ) .B u ta st h ee c o n o m yb e c o m e sm o r eu n e q u a las m a l l e rs h a r eo fp o p u l a t i o nc h o o s et ob e
employed in innovative activities.12 Therefore an inverted-U shape curve may emerge. The
intuition is that for low level of inequality more dispersion induces some type-2 individuals
















14to move into the invention business, even if the demand for innovation shrinks, because the
productivity diﬀerential eﬀect (h
φ− α
1−β) prevails.
The blueprint’s value. Eq. (6) can be rearranged as:

























(1 +  )
α
1−β], (22)
which indicates that a wider dispersion of human capital aﬀects the value of innovation in
two ways:
a) The ﬁrst two terms inside the square brackets capture the negative eﬀect of inequality
— total output declines with inequality, and therefore the rent of the inventor goes down as
well. The descending curve in Fig. (2.B) illustrates this aspect.
b) The term 1
2l2, enters with a negative sign to emphasize that the inventors are a group
of people that in principle could be employed into the ﬁnal output sector. Therefore the
larger the level of human capital of type-2 individuals, the larger the potential market loss
for new designs, the lower the price of a design. The inverted U-shaped curve in Fig. (2.B)
p l o t st h el a s tt e r mo ft h es q u a r eb r a c k e t s( l2
1
2(1 +  )
α
1−β). It closely traces the behavior of
t h ep l o ti np a n e lA .T h eo v e r a l le ﬀect of   on P is highlighted by the plot in panel D. For
the set of parameters in use the ’inequality’ eﬀect dominates, so that a larger   is associated
with a lower blueprint’s value.








2l2 declines in  , at least when this is large enough — see plot A—, and since H2 is always
increasing  , the rate of innovation may go either way when inequality rises: The quality
of inventors (H2) is higher, but inequality reduces the design’s value and some inventors
abandon the innovation business. To understand how these two competing forces operate,
it is useful to rearrange the above expression as
g = δH























1−β −1γ0 + φ
1
δβτHφ(1 +  )φ+1,
where γ0 indicates the partial of γ with respect to  ; the partial is approximately equal to −2. Therefore,
1
2l2,G( ) is increasing in   when this assumes relatively low values, that is in the region that approximately
satisﬁes the condition
δβτHφ(1 +  )φ+1







and is decreasing otherwise.
15The negative eﬀe c to fi n e q u a l i t yi sa c c o u n t e db yt h ee x p r e s s i o ni nt h es q u a r eb r a c k e t ,w h e r e a s
the positive eﬀect is captured by the term in front of the square bracket. Clearly if there
are constant return to scale in the ﬁnal good sector ( α
1−β =1 ), a wider dispersion in human
capital has always a positive eﬀect on the rate of innovation under the assumption that
φ> α
1−β.B u ti f α
1−β < 1, the innovation rate can go up or down, depending on the parameter
values. (One can verify that the partial derivative of the right-hand side of Eq. (23) with
respect to   is positive for
2(1+ )




, approximately, and negative otherwise).
Intuitively, as we move away from a situation of complete equality, the reduction in the
design’s value caused by the rising inequality is small and only few innovators, if any, switch
activity to become ﬁnal good producers. The better quality of inventors is the prevailing
force and therefore the result is a higher innovation rate. Conversely, as inequality becomes
more pronounced, the reduction in the number of inventors is so substantial that it cannot
be compensated by the higher productivity of the residual inventors. Fig(2.C), which plots
gG against ε, shows the inverted-U relationship between the innovation rate and inequality
just described.
To sum up, a relatively small departure from a situation of equality does induce more
innovation whereas large deviations from it generate the opposite result. The intuition is
quite straightforward: at ﬁrst the ’quality’ eﬀect — researchers are endowed with higher
human capital — more than compensate the ’quantity eﬀect’ — a reduction in the size of the
R&D sector— if any. But as   increases the ’quantity’ eﬀects kicks in and it more than oﬀsets
the higher per-innovator yielding, bringing down the innovation rate. Finally, notice that
the level of inequality that maximizes the rate of innovation does not depend on the average
level of human capital. Indeed, ﬁnding the optimal value of   in Eq. (23) is equivalent at
ﬁnding the optimal value of the expression (1 +  )
φ− α
1−β[1
2(1 +  )
α
1−β + 1
2(1 −  )
α
1−β] which
depends only on the parameters of the elasticities φ, α,a n dβ.
4.0.3 Example 3: Uniform Distribution
The pdf of human capital is uniform in an interval of length d with mean equal to μ.T h e
extremes of the support of the distribution then are μ−d/2 and μ+d/2,w h e r ed conveniently
measures how dispersed the distribution is around the mean. Under these circumstances,














the population share of inventors is 1/2+1









1+φ − ¯ h
1+φ].
16Figure 2: High vs. Low Skills
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Parameters: H =1 0 ;β =0 .27;α =0 .53;δ =0 .003;φ =1 .04;η = z =1 .


















In all above expressions ¯ h satisﬁes Eq. (24). Fig (3) proposes a similar set of plots as Fig.
(2) except that this time the variable capturing inequality (running on the horizontal axis)
is the parameter d.P l o t ( A ) c o n ﬁrms that after a certain threshold, increasing levels of
inequality cause a reduction in the share of population employed as inventors. The same line
of reasoning developed in the previous example can be applied now to explain the inverted-U
shape of the curve in plot A. Inequality has an adverse eﬀect on the design’s price, inducing
people to leave the business of innovation, but it also makes more marked the productivity
advantage of an inventor vis-à-vis an output producer’s. Indeed if the diﬀerence between
φ and α/(1 − β), increases, the maximizer of the plot in Panel (A) moves to the right.
Conversely as φ −α/(1 − β) gets smaller a larger section of the plot becomes descending,
because the design’s price eﬀect becomes the dominant force in the individuals’ occupational
choice. However, for the given set of parameters, the decline in the number of inventors is
not big enough to compensate the innovators’ increased productivity, which eventually is the
prevailing force in determining the innovation rate.
Conclusion 1 Variations in human capital inequality inﬂuence individuals’ occupational
choices between innovative and non-innovative activities and the innovation rate of the econ-
omy. However the intervening mechanisms that link changes in the dispersion of human
capital and innovation activities operate in an ambiguous way. More human capital inequal-
ity per se reduces the value of an invention, for the demand of the intermediate products
embodying a given invention declines. Therefore the would-be inventors are more likely to
turn their attention to output production if the expected rent that they can extract from the
invention is small. But on the other side inventors’ productivity is higher in an unequal
economy as they receive a ﬁner education.
Section (7) attempts to solve the ambiguities that emerged in the previous two examples
by calibrating the model on the balanced growth path.
5 Balanced Growth Path
5.1 Production Side
The aggregate stock of capital can be computed by summing up all the intermediate goods in
use and multiplying the resulting quantity by η so that it is expressed in terms of units of con-
sumption goods (recall that η is the quantity of consumption goods required to build on unit
18Figure 3: Uniform Distribution
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Parameters: H =1 0 0 ;β =0 .27;α =0 .58;δ =0 .0018;φ =1 .04;η = z =1 .
19of capital). Integrating Eq. (3) with respect to h in the interval [0, ¯ h] o n ec o m p u t e st h eo v e r a l l
demand for one type of intermediate goods, which is equal to (
zβ
p(i))1/(1−β) R ¯ h
0 (h)α/(1−β)dF(h).
There are N intermediate goods, of which M a r ep r i c e da tt h em a r g i n a lc o s t( p(i)=rη) and

























Notice that if ¯ h,r, and m are constant, a situation which holds on the balanced growth path,
then
Y = AK, (27)





6S a v i n g s
To close the model the consumer preferences need to be speciﬁed. I assume a utility function









which implies that the intertemporal optimization condition for a consumer faced with the




(rt − ρ), (28)
where gc(t) is the annual growth rate of per capita consumption and 1
σ is the elasticity of
substitution.
6 . 1 B a l a n c e dG r o w t hP a t h
I want to characterize an equilibrium in which the variables K,Y, and N,g r o wa tc o n s t a n t
exponential rates, and both ¯ h and the interest rate are constant. By inspecting Eq. (28) one
realizes that if the interest rate is constant, gc(t) is constant too. Furthermore A also remains
constant — m(¯ h) depends on ¯ h and on r both of which are required to stay constant. From
equation (27) we learn that K and Y must grow at the same rate. The clearing condition
20Y = C + ˙ K implies that also aggregate consumption grows at the same rate of K and Y .
Population is constant by assumption. Therefore aggregate and per capita consumption
grow at the same rate. Hence the growth rate of K, Y and c are equal to each other
gK = gY = gc.
Finally equation (25) implies that the ratio K/N remains constant along the balanced growth
path. We can thus conclude that on the balanced growth path
gK = gY = gc =¯ g, (29)
where ¯ g is determined by the system of equations (11)—(14) along with equation (28) under
the assumption that r(t)=r.
7C a l i b r a t i o n
The objective of the experiment is to compare economies that are on their balanced growth
path and diﬀer only in the dispersion of human capital with the purpose of answering the
following three questions. Does a more equal economy: a) have a high share of the population
engaged in the business of invention? b) spun innovation at a faster pace? c) place a higher
value on a new idea?
7.1 Measuring Human Capital Dispersion
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the experiment is the choice of an appropriate human
capital distribution. Psychologists have for long time have been busy in determining the
IQs distribution for diﬀerent segment of the society. For instance it has been proposed a
normal distribution with mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15 to represent the IQ
distribution of England pupils at the age of 15th, and to standardize the IQs distribution of
other countries to the English one13. But there is hardly any consensus on the signiﬁcancy
of IQ tests in measuring human cognitive abilities. Even if they were accurate, it is not clear
that cognitive ability is the most appropriate way of measuring the kind of human capital
that serves to improve production eﬃciency or to facilitate technology adoption. Cognitive
abilities may only be one input into the process of accumulating human capital, and again
there is quite a lot of disagreement on how the ’production function’ of human capital looks
like. Carneiro and Heckman (2004) question the notion that human capital is to be strictly
linked to cognitive abilities. They survey studies suggesting that other attributes, such as
13Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) created an IQ data set for 81 countries on the basis of an extensive survey
of psychological studies.
21perseverance, dependability, optimisms are important predictors of grades in school and that
these traits are also among the most valued ones by employers. Nevertheless the Mincerian
and Beckerian literature uses extensively educational data as a measure of human capital.
Several types of education-based data are available to measure distributional changes. Table
(1) contains information on pupils’ achievements in mathematics at the age of 15, recorded in
a recent survey conducted by the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).
In several instances countries with similar mean scores have shown substantial diﬀerences in
variance. For instance the mean score of Japanese and Canadians pupils is about the same
but the estimated variance of Japanese pupils’ score is 30 percent larger than the Canadian
pupils’. A similar observation can be made for Germany and Ireland. The existence of
such dispersion within the same educational level might partly account for Juhn, Murphy,
and Piere (1993) observation that the majority of the increases in U. S. wage inequality in
the 1980s was due to unobserved attributes of workers belonging to the same educational
or demographic group, provided that knowledge acquired in school played a larger role in
production. As mentioned in section (2), the dispersion in pupils’ educational achievements
maybe magniﬁed if the educational system is highly meritocratic in the sense that it functions
as eﬀective screening process whereby pupils in the right tail of the distribution end up into
higher levels of education, and this is of a high-quality variety. Table (2), which records
annual expenditures in tertiary education relative to non-tertiary education for most OECD
countries, informs us that the commitment in tertiary education is much larger in the US
both in absolute and in relative terms than any of the other country included in the survey.
For the sake of the experiment instead of taking one speciﬁc view on the process of human
capital formation I propose a Gamma distribution that, appropriately parametrized, yields
an income distribution close to the one observed in the US in recent years.
7.2 Parameters
T h ec h o i c eo ft h eb a s e l i n ev a l u e sf o rt h ev e c t o ro fp a r a m e t e r s( z,η,ρ,σ,β,α,T,φ,δ)i sm o r e
straightforward. The productivity parameters associated with the production of ﬁnal output
and capital, z and η, respectively, do not play any role in the equilibrium condition (15);
therefore I set both of them equal 1. The preferences parameters ρ =0 .02 and σ =2in line
with many other studies. The output elasticity to the capital goods it is rarely considered
below 0.25 and is often set at around 0.3. I start with a baseline β =0 .27. The parameter
α sets the returns on human capital. I will assume mild diminishing returns to scale in the
ﬁnal sector, so that inequality can generate eﬀects similar to the one illustrated in examples
1 and 2, section (4). Hence α =1− β − 0.05. The length of monopoly pricing is T =2 0 , in
line with the patents’ legislation in many countries. There are no ready estimates for φ and
δ.Nevertheless there is a constraint given by (A1): φ>α / (1−β). I will restrict my attention
22Rank Country Mean score 




1 Finland 544.29 81.16
2 Korea 542.23 99.28
3 Netherlands 537.82 91.90
4 Japan 534.14 116.31
5 Canada 532.49 88.75
6 Belgium 529.29 121.76
7 Switzerland 526.55 111.04
8 Australia 524.27 105.15
9 New Zealand  523.49 110.06
10 Czech Republic  516.46 99.87
11 Iceland 515.11 94.52
12 Denmark 514.29 96.47
13 France 510.80 NA
14 Sweden 509.05 103.34
15 Austria 505.61 98.39
16 Germany 502.99 108.29
17 Ireland 502.84 83.94
18 Slovak Republic 498.18 98.66
19 Norway 495.19 98.13
20 Luxembourg 493.21 98.13
21 Poland 490.24 94.70
22 Hungary 490.01 101.55
23 Spain 485.11 90.80
24 United States  482.89 104.93
25 Portugal 466.02 88.99
26 Italy 465.66 106.52
27 Greece 444.91 101.84
28 Turkey 423.42 127.45
29 Mexico 385.22 84.89
OECD average 500.00 100.00
Source: OECD (2005) Table A6.1; OECD PISA (2003), Table 4.1a.
Table 1: Dispersion in Educational Achievement
23Rank 
(last 
Col.)   
Country   
Non-
tertiary 
education   
All tertiary 
education   
Tertiary/Non-
Tertiary   
(Percentage of GDP) (Ratio)
1 United States 4.1    2.6   0.64
2 Korea 4.1    2.2   0.54
3 Greece 2.7    1.2   0.46
4 Finland 3.9    1.8   0.45
5 Denmark 4.2    1.9   0.45
6 Turkey 2.6    1.2   0.45
7 Ireland 3.1    1.3   0.41
8 Spain 3.2    1.2   0.39
9 Sweden 4.6    1.8   0.38
10 Australia 4.2    1.6   0.38
11 Hungary 3.3    1.2   0.37
12 Netherlands 3.4    1.3   0.37
13 Poland 4.1    1.5   0.37
14 Japan 3.0    1.1   0.37
15 Norway 4.3    1.5   0.34
16 Mexico 4.1    1.4   0.34
17 Czech Republic 2.9    0.9   0.32
18 Belgium 4.3    1.4   0.32
19 Slovak Republic 2.8    0.9   0.31
20 New Zealand 4.9    1.5   0.31
21 Germany 3.6    1.1   0.30
22 Switzerland 4.6    1.4   0.30
23 Austria 3.8    1.1   0.29
24 Italy 3.5    0.9   0.27
25 United Kingdom 4.3    1.1   0.27
26 France 4.2    1.1   0.26
27 Portugal 4.2    1.0   0.24
28 Iceland 5.7    1.1   0.19
Canada NA NA NA
Luxembourg 3.9    NA NA
Source: Author’s elab. based on OECD (2005), Table B2.1c 
Table 2: Expenditure in Education in OECD countries, by level of education (2002)
24Hβ α δ φ η z T σ ρ
100 0.27 1 − β − 0.05 0.00105 1.05 112 020 .02
T a b l e3 :B a s e l i n eP a r a m e t e r s
to cases where there are constant or mild increasing returns on human capital for inventors,
considering φ ranging between 1 and 1.05. Once this parameter is set, and the average of
human capital is normalized to 100,t h ep a r a m e t e rδ becomes the tuning instrument to set
the innovation rate of the economy. This parameter is set to 0.00105, as in combination
with the above speciﬁed parameters yields a rate of innovation of about 2%, very close to
the average growth rate of US per capita income in the last 15 years.
7.3 Results
Plot (4) is a graphical illustration of Lemma 1: All individuals above a threshold level of
human capital are inventors, and the rest ﬁnal good producers. A point in the descending
line in Fig. (5.A) represents the number of inventors, obtained as integral of the distribution
for values above ¯ h, for a given variance of the distribution. As the variance increases the
right tail of the distribution becomes heavier, but at the same time ¯ h may move to the
right because innovations are worth less. Indeed in the experiment ¯ h increases so much that
the number of innovators declines notewithstanding the heavier tail. Not surprisingly, then,
the average quality of the inventors relative to that of producers rises with inequality, both
because there are more of outstanding individuals, and because ¯ h moves to the right.
The implied values of the real interest rate for each level of inequality is shown in plot
C. This rate does not exceed the Mehra and Prescott (1985)’s estimate of the average stock
returns in the post-war period (seven percent) which presumably includes some compensation
for risk taking. Plot D conﬁrms the intuition that inventors move to the ﬁnal-goods sector
when inequality increases, because the value of a design falls.
The most important plot is that contained in panel B, which shows that movement of
the rate of innovation against the Gini coeﬃcient. The slope of the schedule is about 0.0145,
meaning that an increase in the Gini value by 0.1 is associated with a faster rate of innovation
of some 0.145 percentage points. To appreciate the importance of a 0.1 increase in the Gini
value, perhaps it is useful to say that change that occurred in US in the late 1970s and
1980s, which alarmed many social scientists, is measured between a variation of 0.05 and 0.1
—see Table (4)— of the Gini scale. It also correspond to one standard deviation of the Gini
coeﬃcients computed for a large number of countries by Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000).
The slope of the rate of innovation-inequality schedule is smaller than Barro’s estimated
coeﬃcient relating the growth rate of per capita income to inequality, which he found to be
25Figure 4: Gamma Distribution






































Parameters: a=1.1765 and b=85
26Figure 5: Case with mild Decreasing Returns to Scale
























































































Note: For parameters see Table (3).
270.05, for high- and medium-income countries.
Table (4) reports summary statistics that describe the evolution of household inequality
in the US since 1967. From the table emerges that the rise of the Gini value is due to
the dramatic increase in the percentage of income accruing to the top 20% and top 5% of
the population and to the lower appropriations accounted by the bottom two ﬁfths of the
population. The appropriateness of the Gamma distribution will be judged on its ability
to replicate the type of data collected in the table, which add to the number of constraints
to be followed in the calibration exercise. I will proceed in two steps. First the parameters
a and b of the Gamma distribution are varied to the point in which the Gini coeﬃcient is
close to the one estimated by DeNavas-Watt et al. (2003) for the year of interest. Then the
fraction of income accounted by each ﬁfth of the population, ordered according to the level
of income, is compared with that reported in Table (4).14
The income Gini value will depend on the choice of the parameters of the Gamma dis-
tribution (a,b), which however are bound by the constraint a =1 0 0 /b (because H =1 0 0 ).
Therefore I search for the value of b that delivers the Gini coeﬃcient recorded in 1967 and
in 2001. Table (5) compares the calibrated distribution of income with the actual one and
also reports the calibrated innovation rate and real interest rate (columns g and r)w h i c ha r e
equal to some 2% and 6%, respectively. Between 1991 and 2004 the average annual growth
rate of per capita gross domestic product has been 1.96%,the average interest rate on the
10-year US Treasury security was 5.86%, and the average annual inﬂation rate, computed
with the CPI-U index, was about 2.6%. However the returns on funds invested in stocks are
likely to be higher than the government bonds’ returns of 3.3% (≈ 5.86% −2.6%). Prescott
and Mehra (1985) estimated an average stocks return of 7% f o rt h ep o s t w a rp e r i o d . T h e
interest rate implied by the model is in between these two ﬁgures.
From the table emerges that in both years the models overestimate by about 4% the
income of the top 5%. It also overestimates, though by a lower magnitude, the income
accruing to the bottom two ﬁfths of households. In other words the model predicts too much
equality in the bottom part of the distribution and too much inequality in the top part. If
we keep the type of distribution given, then only a ﬁne-tuning of the parameters α and φ,
can reduce the diﬀerences between the data and the calibration results. The bottom part
of the distribution is employed in output production. An increase in α magniﬁes income
inequality for a given distribution of human capital. Conversely, less inequality among the
14The model implies a tight relationship between the distribution of human capital and that of income. Of
course in reality the link between the two distributions needs not to be working as described in the model, as
this does not consider explicitly the government’s tax and spending policy. Nevertheless, government educa-
tional spending and other redistributive policies are usually highly correlated. If human capital disparity is
inversely related to the amount of government funding of public education, then calibrating a model without
considering the role of ﬁscal policies probably would not aﬀect the results dramatically.
28Year Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest top 5% Gini
2002 3.5 8.8 14.8 23.3 49.7 21.7 0.462
1990 3.9 9.6 15.9 24 46.6 18.6 0.428
1980 4.3 10.3 16.9 24.9 43.7 15.8 0.403
1970 4.1 10.8 17.4 24.5 43.3 16.6 0.396
1967 4 10.8 17.3 24.2 43.8 17.5 0.399
Source: Table A-3, Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al. (2003)
Table 4: Share of Aggregate Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 percent; Gini Coef-
ﬁcient
Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest top 5% Gini g r
US in 2002 3.5 8.8 14.8 23.3 49.7 21.7 0.462
Calibration 3.95 9.16 14.57 22.81 50.5 25.52 0.463 2.16 6.33
Difference -0.45 -0.36 0.23 0.49 -0.8 -3.82
US in 1967 4 10.8 17.3 24.2 43.8 17.5 0.399
Calibration 5.77 10.97 15.72 21.68 45.86 21.99 0.399 2.05 6.11
Difference -1.77 -0.17 1.58 2.52 -2.06 -4.49
Source: Table (4) and Author’s Calculation. For Parameters see Table (3)
Note: Columns g and r report the calibrated innovation and real interest rates, resp.
Table 5: Matching the Income Distribution
richest can only be obtained with a decline in φ.
The calibration exercise presented so far assumed that an innovation is protected for
20 years, in line with current patent legislation. A simulation with a longer T would have
as m a l le ﬀect on the slope of the schedule. For instance if T goes from 20 to 40 years,
the slope becomes about half of the original one. Of course a larger T shifts upward the
growth schedule, as more individuals ﬂock into the invention business lured by the longer
rent periods. Perhaps surprisingly, variations in T do not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the price of the
innovation. Although a higher T makes an invention worth more because inventors extract
monopoly rents for a longer period of time the fact that more people migrates into this
sector from the ﬁnal-goods sector causes the demand of intermediate inputs to shrink, and
inventions’ users are less willing to bid for a high price.
7.4 Sensitivity Analysis and the Dual Role of Human Capital
How sensitive are the values of the Gini coeﬃcient and of the rate of innovation to variations
in α,β and φ?
29Figure 6: The Dual Role of Human Capital


























































h as an input in production h as ability to adopt new technologies
In Romer’s model human capital enters the production function as an input. Keeping
constant the quantity of capital, an individual with higher knowledge is more eﬃcient in
production. Nelson and Phelps (1966) however contended that the most important role of
education and knowledge acquisition is not so much in improving the workers’ eﬃciency given
the quality and quantity of capital, but rather facilitating the adoption of new technologies.
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) report evidence in favor of this view. In a cross-country re-
gressions they found that growth of GDP per capita from 1965 to 1985 was not signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the rise of average educational attainments but it was positively associated with
the level of education in 1965. Fortunately the model is compatible with this view of human
capital as well. One can embrace the idea that knowledge is essential in technology adoption
but plays a minor role in improving production eﬃciency by attributing a small value to
α, the output elasticity to human capital, and a large one to the parameter β.I st h ew e a k
relationship between inequality and innovation any diﬀerent when β is large relative to α?
It is.
Fig. (6) plots the ’slope’ of the innovation-rate-inequality schedule against β.I ts h o w s
that as β increases (and correspondingly α declines) the positive relationship between in-
equality and innovation becomes stronger and stronger. The intuition is quite straightfor-
30Lowest Second Third Fourth Highesttop 5% Gini g r
US in 2002 3.5 8.8 14.8 23.3 49.7 21.7 0.462
Calibration with β=0.27 3.95 9.16 14.57 22.81 50.5 25.52 0.463 2.16 6.33
Difference -0.45 -0.36 0.23 0.49 -0.8 -3.82
Calibration with β=0.67 4.53 9.82 14.98 21.64 49.03 25.16 0.463 1.13 4.26
Difference -1.03 -1.02 -0.18 1.66 0.67 -3.46
Source: Author’s Elaboration and Table (4)
Note: The parameters’ values are the same as Table (5)
Table 6: Distribution of Income with High and Low beta
ward. The relationship between the dispersion of human capital and income depends cru-
cially on the value of α. When this is small, a given dispersion in human capital translates
into a smaller dispersion of income. Therefore to generate a given income Gini value a wider
dispersion of human capital is required as α gets smaller. In other words the weaker the link
between human capital and income inequality the steeper the rate-of-innovation-inequality
schedule.
In Table (6) the calibrated distribution of income is reported for β =0 .27 (baseline case)
and β =0 .67. In the latter case human capital is relatively more important in facilitating
technological adoption than it is in the former case. Notice that the parameters of the
underlying human capital distributions are adjusted so as to match the calibrated Gini value
with the one estimated by the Census. The table shows that even if β varies considerably
(0.4), it is still possible to replicate the observed distribution of income.
Another veriﬁcation involves a reduction of α, keeping constant β =0 .27, so as to test the
sensitivity of the innovation inequality relationship to variations in the degree of diminishing
returns of the production function to both physical and human capital, measured by α+β.
It turns out that the slope is similar to Barro’s estimated correlation of 0.5 when the sum
of these coeﬃcients is 0.75. Setting a and b so that the Gini value is close to that estimated
for the year 2002 (0.46), the computed fractions of income accounted by the each quintile,
reported in the second raw of Table (7) are signiﬁcantly further away from the actual ones
(ﬁrst raw). The second part of the table proposes another such exercise trying to use φ to
ﬁne-tune the slope to Barro’s estimate. Again, for a combination of a and b that delivers a
Gini close to 0.46, the distribution seems to be quite far oﬀ the mark, except for the second
lowest quintile and the top 5 percent.
Conclusion 2 Under parametrization of the production functions that imply only mild de-
viations from constant returns to scale (α + β>0.95 and φ<1.05, with φ>α+ β), the
31slope of the rate-of-innovation-inequality schedule is about 0.15, assuming that human capital
enters signiﬁcantly (α high) as an input in production (that is a change in the Gini coeﬃcient
of 0.1 is associated with a 0.15% change of the innovation rate). When human capital is
viewed as knowledge that facilitates the adoption of technologies, the slope more than doubles
and becomes close to Barro’s estimate, but the distribution of income gets further away from
the actual one. Similarly, it is possible to increase the slope innovation-inequality to 0.5 by
introducing severe diminishing returns on capital (α+β =0 .75)o rs i g n i ﬁcant increasing re-
turns in the R&D sector (φ =1 .2). But in both scenarios, however, the resulting distribution
of income is far away from the actual one.
Next I will argue that a more radical transformation of the framework — that is opening-
up the economy to international ﬂow of ideas — makes the innovation rate more sensitive to
distributional changes.
8 International Flow of Innovations: Some Considera-
tions
Up to now the analysis of the relationship between the distribution of human capital and
the intensity of innovation activity was carried out under the premise that the economy was
close to the rest of the world. The objective of this section is to relax the assumption to
study situations in which ideas, workers, and output are free to move on the international
market. I will limit my discussion to a special case in which the world is formed by two
countries, identical except for inequality in human capital.15 It will also be assumed that
ideas generated in either country generates positive spillovers for the creation of more ideas
in the future. Inventors are inspired either by observing the functioning of existing machines,
or by studying the designs on the basis of which they are built, or by a combination of both.
This notion of spillovers is diﬀerent from the popular one which holds that trade is the main
vehicle for knowledge transmission— see for instance in Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Ch.6,
and Long and Wong (1997). I am abstracting from the eﬀect of trade on innovation not
because trade is irrelevant for the matter I am investigating — quite to the contrary it has
been amply documented that trade is positively correlated with innovation, although the
causal relationship is still debated — but to keep the analysis focused on the motive that
inventions are the outcome of explicit investment decisions. Speciﬁcally I will assume:
15However, I will abstract from the governments’ strategic behavior in taking part into international
agreements on the protection of intellectual property rights. This analysis has been recently carried out by
Grossman and Lay (2004). See also Chin and Grossman (1990), and Deardorﬀ (1992).
32a) An innovation is equally protected in both countries, no matter the residency of the
inventor;
b) The two economies have the same size and use the same technology, both in the
manufacturing sector and in the R&D sector;
c) Preferences over the consumption good, the discount rate, and the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution of the consumption good is the same for all individuals in either country.
d) Ideas are excludable in the manufacturing sector, but not in the R&D sector. Inventors
of both countries have access to all previous blueprints, no matter where they have been
developed.
Under these circumstances all aggregate variables are jointly determined in the two
economies. The instantaneous diﬀu s i o no fi n v e n t i o n sm a k e st h er a t eo fi n n o v a t i o ni d e n -
tical in the two countries — though, it will be clariﬁed, these might diﬀer substantially in
their research eﬀort. The two economies also share the same real interest and the same
price of an invention. And the compensation of two individuals equally skilled is the same.
If the two countries diﬀer in the dispersion of human capital, however, diﬀerences in the
distribution of income will persists. Indeed an interesting insight that will emerge is that an
economy’s capacity to innovate depends on its level of inequality vis-à-vis that prevailing in
the other country.
In what follows I single out the main modiﬁcations of the closed-economy model that are
needed to determine the innovation rate in the two-country world. I will refer to the two
economies (or countries) as F− and G−economy (or country).
First of all, the value of an innovation is increased by the expansion of the market.
















α/(1−β)d ˜ G(h)]. (30)
where ˜ G(h) is a measure of the ﬁnal good producers in the G−economy with human capital
equal or less than h.
Secondly, since the two countries share the same technology and inventions are equally
protected in both countries, no labor migration occurs. The labor market equilibrium condi-
tion is still (15) except that the value of the design, P, is now computed using (30). Therefore,
the equilibrium that pins down ¯ h, for a given interest rate and for a certain expected growth























Finally, the innovation rate is now determined by the joint-eﬀort of innovators from both
33countries. Equation (13) is then replaced by









This speciﬁcation of the creation process follows directly from the above point (e), which
says that the amount of knowledge spills over among inventors regardless of their national-
ity. Notice that the level of human capital of the individual who indiﬀerent between being
an inventor or a ﬁnal-good producer is the same in both countries (h = ¯ h). An obvious
consequence of this feature is that the country that has a human capital distribution with a
relatively heavier right-tail will account for a larger proportion of inventions. Next section
illustrates this point by proposing an extension of one example contained in section (4.0.3).
8.1 Randomization in a two-country model
An increase in the dispersion of human capital, in the second-order sense, is more likely
to aﬀect the innovation capability of an economy in an open or closed world? I will try
to answer this question proposing a randomization exercise similar to the one illustrated in
section (4.0.2): there is no inequality at all in country F, and some inequality in country G.
T h ea n s w e ri sq u i t ed i ﬀerent if the shock aﬀects country F or country G.
8.1.1 The unequal country becomes more so
Lemma 1 established that people with the highest level of skills innovate. Therefore only
residents of the G-economy with high level of skills will be employed in the innovation
business. The labor market equilibrium condition that holds when people can choose the



























l2,G)H(1 +  ). (34)
The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of Eq. (33) accounts for the fact that an inventor resident
in the G-economy collects monopoly rents in the F-economy as well. Therefore the quantity
1
2l2,G is larger than the one that we would observe in a closed G−economy. However, none of
the F-economy’s residents works as an inventor, and the world overall has fewer inventors.






















where γ = H1/H2. The sum of the left sides of Eqs. (35) and (36) is the total number of






















It is easy to verify that the sum of the right-hand sides of Eqs (35) and (36) is smaller
than the right-hand side of Eq. (37); therefore a larger fraction of population is engaged in
non-invention activities in a world with open economies.
Finally by combining Eqs. (35) and (36) we get the rate of innovation in an integrated
world
gW = δH
















which is the same as equation (23) except for the additional number one appearing inside the
square brackets. Clearly the model has a ’scale eﬀect’, as designs serve a larger population
when the economy is open. It is easy to verify that gW >g G and that gW >g F.
How does a shock that causes a rises in human inequality in the G-economy — for instance
some educational redistributive programs are eliminated — aﬀect gW? As in the closed
economy there are two competing forces, one related to the decreasing returns in production,
which lower the value of an innovation, and one with the higher productivity of more educated
inventors that raises the innovation rate. This latter force is more powerful in an open
economy, because of the scale eﬀect.
Notice that in the range for which there is a positive relationship between gW and   the
F-economy beneﬁts from a larger inequality in the G-economy, at least in the long run, for
it enjoys a larger growth rate and is still an economy with no inequality.
8.1.2 The equal country becomes more unequal
Let  F and  G be the percentage of the mean value of human capital in the F-a n dG-economy,
respectively in the randomization example introduced in section (4.0.2). By lemma 1 if  F
<  G, still innovation occurs exclusively in the G-economy, although the innovation rate
gw is lower — in Eq. (38) the number 1 is replaced by 1
2(1 +  F)
α
1−β + 1
2(1 −  F)
α
1−β < 1
and  G substitutes  .C o n v e r s e l y i f  F> G t h er o l eo ft h eG and F economy are reversed
— all innovation activities are carried out in the F-economy. When  F= G a situation of
indeterminacy arises.
35Figure 7: Comparing Gamma Distributions







































9 Calibration in a two-country model
The above example suggested that a country’s innovation capacity depends on its level of
inequality relative to the other country’s. How much does it matter that countries diﬀer
in the dispersion of human capital? I propose to answer this question keeping section (7)’s
assumption that human capital follows a Gamma distribution, now in both countries. Let
ai and bi,f o ri = {F,G} denote the parameters of the Gamma distribution. Since H =1 0 0 ,
then aFbF = aGbG =1 0 0 . Fig. (7) plots the distribution of the economies when and bF <b G
(lower dispersion in the F-economy). The four plots in Fig. (9) are generated with the same
parameters underlying Fig. (5)’s plots, and assuming a very high correlations of inequality in
the two countries (bF =0 .65bG). The Gini coeﬃcient of income running on all four horizontal
axes is that of the G−economy. Likewise the share and quality of inventors refer to the G-
economy only, whereas the remaining variables (the innovation rate, the interest rate, and
the price of an invention, whose behavior is depicted in Plots B, C, and D, respectively) are
the same for both countries.
The remaining parameters’ values are the same as the ones used in the one-country
calibration exercise.
36Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest top 5% Gini
US in 2002 3.5 8.8 14.8 23.3 49.7 21.7 0.462
α+β=0.75; φ=1.05 7.44 9.95 11.74 13.71 57.16 27.76 0.463
Difference -3.94 -1.15 3.06 9.59 -7.46 -6.06
α+β=0.95; φ=1.20 6.73 9.16 10.96 12.98 60.17 19.97 0.467
Difference -3.23 -0.36 3.84 10.32 -10.47 1.73
Source: Author’s Elaboration and Table ( 4).
Note: The parameters’ values not reported are in Table (5).
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis: Comparing Calibrated Model with US Income Distribution
Figure 8: Inequality in Open and Closed Economies










































Note: For parameters see Table 3.
37One feature of the Romer’s model is the scale eﬀect predicted as two economies become
integrated. Fig. (8) gives an idea of the magnitude of the scale eﬀect in the baseline case
(β =0 .27). For a given level of inequality, the world growth rate is between two and three
times larger than the one calculated for the closed economy, a quite unlikely outcome to
be observed when two economies integrate. The magnitude of the scale eﬀect partly is due
to important simplifying assumptions: instantaneous diﬀusion of inventions; no ’stepping
on the toe eﬀect’ — inventors in the two countries might be working on similar problems.
One way to oﬀset the sale eﬀect is by reducing the length of protection of an invention.
Although in principle there is no reason to think that governments pass legislation that
weakens intellectual propriety rights as a consequence of opening-up their economies, it is
likely that competition among inventors rends obsolete existing inventions at a faster rate.
To obtain a rate of innovation for the consolidated economies similar to the one calculated
for the closed economy, T must be slashed by a bit more than a half (from 20 to 9), when
β =0 .27.T h es c a l ee ﬀe c tb e c o m e sl e s ss e v e r ea ts o m eh i g h e rv a l u e so fβ, but remains still
strong. For instance when β = .5 a reduction in T from 20 to about 12 is needed to generate
an innovation-rate-inequality-schedule (not shown) for the open economy that tracks closely
the one calculated for the closed economy (the dashed bottom curve in Fig. (8)).
To easy the comparison between open vs. closed economy Fig. (9) reproduces the plots
in Fig. (5) for an open economy. A quick inspection of the plots reveals that ideas are worth
more when the economy is open (plots (D)), that the innovation rate, and consequently
the interest rate, 16 are larger in the open economy (plots (B) and (C)) and that a bigger
fraction of the population are involved in inventions in the more unequal economy when
this opens its borders (plot (A)). How are invention activities being reallocated between
the two countries as these get more integrated? I will answer to this question under the
assumption that integration does not yield scale eﬀects (that is, running the two-country
economy with a lower T). Fig. (10) shows the fraction of the country’s population engaged
in the business of inventions against inequality, when the economy is closed — top curve—
and when it is open — bottom two curves. Notice that the graph is built in a way that for a
given value of Gini coeﬃcient the rate of innovation is roughly the same in the closed and
open economy (T =2 0when the economy is closed, and T =9otherwise). Not surprisingly
a smaller share of the population is needed to generate a given amount of innovation when
ideas freely circulate. More important is the observation that the number of inventors is
between two and three times larger in the G-economy than in the F-economy, although the
Gini coeﬃcients diﬀer only by some 15%. As already noted, because there is free movement
of workers the threshold in ¯ h will be shared by both countries. This feature combined with
the assumption that the G-economy’s human capital distribution has a heavier tail than the
16The link between the innovation rate and the interest rate is based on Eqs. (28) and (29).
38Figure 9: Inequality and Innovation in the Open G-economy


































































































Note: For parameters’s values see Table 3; bF =0 .65bG;’slope’=2.4)
39Figure 10: Comparing Commitment in Innovation































Note: T equal 9 and 20 in the open and closed case, resp. (no scale eﬀect)
F’s, accounts for the G’s stronger commitment in inventions, and explains the G’s steeper
slope of associated in the plot. I summarize the two main insights if this section as follows.
Conclusion 3 1) The association between inequality and the innovation rate becomes stronger
when closed economies open up their borders and allow free circulation of ideas. 2) The un-
equal economy tends to specialize in business of invention, whereas the equal economy is a
n e ti m p o r t e ro fb l u e p r i n t s .
10 Conclusion
This paper has suggested that policies that aﬀect the dispersion of human capital have
consequences on the market of inventions. In presence of diminishing returns, more inequality
reduces the demand for a new blueprint as well as its market value. But if inequality is
caused by a wider disparity in knowledge acquisition, inventors are more productive in a
more unequal economy, for they are better trained. A simple example in which people
were classiﬁed into high- and low-skilled groups, suggested that for low and medium levels
40of inequality, the relationship between inequality and the rate of innovation is positive,
and negative otherwise. However, once the model was calibrated to the US economy the
sign of the relationship was always positive, within some reasonable parameters’ values. In
particular for a set of preferred parameters the schedule of the innovation rate plotted against
the Gini value computed on income was about 0.15, that is about one third of the partial
correlation estimated by Barro (2000) between the average rate of per capita income and
the Gini coeﬃcient for a set of medium- and high-income countries, and about a tenth of a
similar estimation performed by Forbes (2000). Perhaps the most important aspect of the
calibration exercise is that in a sensitivity analysis the relationship would remain positive
for a wide range of parameters.
Motivated by the desire to study the link between innovation and inequality the paper
has contributed to the theory of endogenous growth by showing that the landmark Romer’s
paper on endogenous growth is a useful framework to analyze issues such as inequality, for
which individuals’ heterogeneity is needed.
Some indications of how inequality aﬀects the market for ideas, and hence growth, in an
open economy were given, but under very special circumstances of one world that consists
of two countries diﬀering only for the variance in human capital. Other aspects, such as
size, initial conditions, terms of trade, and relative distance from the technological frontier,
if included in the analysis, may alter the result about opening-up the economies so far
obtained —the more unequal economy takes the leadership in the innovation market — and
are left for future research.
The question of how much the calibration is sensitive to alternative speciﬁcation of ex-
ternalities also remains open. For instance, in the so-called second-generation of growth
models17, the production of new ideas does not depend linearly on the stock of existing
knowledge, but is strictly concave, thus reducing the role played by knowledge spillovers.
17See Jones (1999) for a review.
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